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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040257-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance 
of counsel at trial? A claim of ineffectiveness presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Nonetheless, ''ineffective assistance of 
counsel falls on the end of the spectrum subject to de novo review of the ultimate legal 
question of whether the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 
1995). 
To establish a claim of ineffective counsel, defendants must show: "(1) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the 
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error." 
1 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 
473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Orrin Bruce Wallace appeals from the March 12, 2004, judgment, sentence and 
commitment of the Fifth District Court after a conviction of assault by a prisoner, a third 
degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Orrin Bruce Wallace was charged by information filed in the Fifth District Court 
on or about May 23, 2004, with assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-102.5 (R. 1). 
At the preliminary hearing on June 9, 2003, the trial court found probable cause 
to bind Wallace over for trial (R. 14-15, 132 at 13). On June 16, 2003, Wallace entered 
a plea of not guilty (R. 17). 
On September 30, 2003, Wallace was convicted of assault by a prisoner by Judge 
Beacham (R. 35-36, 135). On the same date as the trial, Wallace, pro se, filed a motion 
alleging that he was being selectively prosecuted (R. 37-58). Wallace had informed his 
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counsel of this issue but she refused to address it and informed the trial court at the 
beginning of trial that it "is something he is doing on his own, it's not connected with 
my representation" (R. 135 at 4). Trial counsel also informed the trial court that she had 
advised Wallace that his motion should be presented, if necessary, at the "end of the 
case" (Id.). 
On October 6, 2003, Wallace, pro se, filed-in substance-the same motion 
alleging selective prosecution (R. 63A-63G). Wallace also requested an evidentiary 
hearing on the matter (R. 62). A oopy of these documents is included in the Addenda. 
On November 13, 2003, Wallace was sent to the Utah State Prison for a 60-day 
diagnostic evaluation (R. 69-71). On March 4, 2004, Gutierrez was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 87-89). 
On March 19, 2004, Wallace, pro se, filed a notice of appeal in Fifth District 
Court (R. 91) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 15, 2003, Orrin Wallace and David Zserai got into a verbal altercation at 
the Purgatory Correctional Facility in Washington County, Utah (R. 135 at 6). Wallace 
had been playing handball in the mini-yard while Zserai was sitting down against the 
wall watching (R. 135 at 12). During the game there was a discrepancy in a call and 
Zserai voiced his opinion (R. 135 at 12-13). According to Zserai, Wallace got angry, 
started yelling, and then ran over to him and hit him with his fist one time on the left 
side of his face (R. 135 at 13, 22). Zserai testified that the inside of his cheek was cut 
and he had some scratches (R. 135 at 13, 14). Zserai denied hitting Wallace but testified 
that he "might have pushed him or something" (R. 135 at 15). Prior to this incident the 
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two were friends and after the incident they really had no interaction as they both spent 
time in lock-down (R. 135 at 16). 
Wallace testified that while he was playing handball, observers-including Zserai, 
were interrupting play by "making false calls" (R. 135 at 58). Wallace stated that he 
heard Zserai call him a "stupid black mother-f..er" (R. 135 at 59). Wallace walked 
towards Zserai and asked him who he was calling out (Id.). According to Wallace, 
Zserai responded "you, you stupid f-k"(Id.). Wallace then "lost i f and smacked Zserai 
with an open hand (Id.). According to Wallace, Zserai then got up and slapped him (R. 
135 at 61). 
Zserai had a small cut on his upper inside lip that did not require stitches or 
further treatment (R. 135 at 7, 9) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wallace asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent trial 
counsel. The record clearly shows that Wallace's trial counsel, Brenda Whiteley, knew 
that Wallace was concerned about the prosecutor's alleged bias against Wallace and the 
selective prosecution based on his race (R. 135 at 3-4). However, Whiteley was 
unwilling to pursue the motion or even insure that the motion was timely filed and heard 
by the trial court. In fact, she specifically told the trial court that Wallace had to proceed 
with the motion "on his own" because she did not want to be "connected" with the 
motion; and that she did not believe the motion needed to be raised or addressed prior to 
trial (R. 135 at 3-4). Wallace's affidavit shows that his claim is meritorious in that he 
has at least carried his burden to establish selective prosecution. Therefore, Wallace 
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was prejudiced by Whiteley's deficient performance because had his motion been timely 
filed and pursued, an evidentiary hearing likely would have been held. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WALLACE'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN 
FAILING TO TIMELY FILE OR PURSUE HIS MOTION 
REGARDING SELECTIVE PROSECUTION 
Wallace asserts that he was selectively prosecuted because of his being an 
African American and the prosecutor's personal vendetta against him, thereby violating 
his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and his rights to the uniform operation of laws under Article I, Section 24 
of the Utah Constitution. Wallace further asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to timely file his 
motion of selective prosecution. Accordingly, Wallace's conviction should be reversed 
and remanded and an evidentiary hearing held to determine this issue. 
"Prosecutors are given broad discretion in determining whether to prosecute. As 
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, 
the decision regarding whether to prosecute 'generally rests entirely in [the 
prosecutor's] discretion.'" State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1988) (citing 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)). However, 
"the decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard 
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" Id. (citing Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)). In order to establish 
a prima facie case for selective prosecution, thus shifting the burden to the State, "the 
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defendant must demonstrate that a prosecutorial policy results in a discriminatory effect, 
based on an unlawful classification." Id. (citing Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 
1531). Or, the defendant must make an "initial showing" that "(1) he was singled out 
for prosecution while others similarly situated were not generally prosecuted; and (2) the 
prosecution was invidiously based on racial, religious, or other impermissible 
considerations." United States v. Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159, 161 (10th Cir. App. 1986). 
In State v. Geer, 765 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1988), Geer was convicted of bigamy. Id. 
at 2. Before trial, Geer filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the State selectively 
prosecutes only those bigamists who practice bigamy for other than religious reasons. 
Id. at 3. To support this claim, Geer offered an affidavit of Robert Adkins, the county 
attorney, which stated that he had never been requested by law enforcement officers or 
others to file bigamy charges, except against Greer. Id. However, the affidavit also 
stated that at the time the charges were filed, Adkins did not know whether Geer's 
bigamy practice was based on religious convictions or for other reasons and that he 
would prosecute persons under the bigamy statute regardless of religious convictions. 
Id. Adkins further stated his decision to prosecute was based solely on whether there 
was sufficient evidence to convict. Id. 
This Court held that Geer failed to establish that he was being treated differently 
than any other bigamist or that the State had a discriminatory policy against non-
religious bigamists. Geer, 765 P.2d at 4. Because Geer failed to meet his burden of 
proof, the trial court properly denied his motion. Id. 
In United States v. Bryant, 5 F.3d 474 (10th Cir. 1993), Bryant requested an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was being selectively prosecuted on the 
basis of his race. Id. at 475. Bryant, along with one hundred other individuals, was 
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arrested for distributing drugs to an undercover police officer. Bryant, an African 
American, along with nine other African Americans, were prosecuted in Federal Court 
whereas all others were prosecuted in State Court. Id; see also United States v. Bryant, 
No. 91-CR-27W (D. Utah April 30, 1992) (order denying request for evidentiary 
hearing). Defendant filed a motion of selective prosecution contending he was being 
singled out because of his race, but he failed to file an affidavit to substantiate the 
charges of selective prosecution based on race. Id. The trial court denied the motion and 
Bryant was convicted. Id. On appeal, The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided not to 
reach the merits of Bryant's claims on the basis that the motion was filed after trial and 
therefore the claim was waived. Id. 
In the present case, Wallace admitted at trial that he slapped Mr. Zserai while 
playing handball in the prison court (R. 135 at 59-60). Wallace contends, however, that 
he personally knows of other inmates that have been charged for fighting and other 
threatening conduct that received lesser charges or plea agreements for their conduct (R. 
37-38, 60-61, 62-63). Instead of receiving a reduced penalty like other inmates similarly 
situated, Wallace was charged to the full extent of the law, assault by a prisoner, a third 
degree felony (R. 1). Unlike Geer and Bryant, wherein the defendants failed to present 
sufficient evidence of selective prosecution based on religion or race, Wallace did file 
an affidavit with the trial court supporting his claims of selective prosecution based on 
race (R. 37-38, 62-63). The affidavit asserts that white inmates had the opportunity to 
plea bargain in order to receive a lesser charge and penalty (R. 63-G). Wallace 
specifically refers to an incident where Chad White, a white man, crushed another 
inmate's sinus and was given a Class B misdemeanor (R. 63-A). Wallace also refers to 
another incident wherein Fred Mitchell, a Native American, was involved in an 
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altercation with another inmate and charged with Assault By a Prisoner, but was allowed 
to plea down to a lesser degree (R. 63-A, B). Wallace, an African American, was not 
afforded the same leniencies. The prosecutor never offered Wallace a plea bargain 
which he asserts he would have readily accepted (R. 63-B). Therefore, Wallace has 
carried his burden of proof and has established at least a prima facie case that he was 
selectively prosecuted on the basis of his race in violation of his rights. 
However, due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness, Wallace's first affidavit for entry 
of selective prosecution was filed on the date of trial, September 30, 2003, and the 
motion for evidentiary hearing was filed after trial (R. 37-38, 62-63). The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
require motions based on selective prosecution must be filed prior to trial. Bryant, 5 F.3d 
at 476. Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is similar to the federal rules, 
and in the event that this Court deems Wallace's motion untimely, he asserts that he was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel for filing the motion 
late. 
Utah has adopted the two-part test for determining when a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated: "To prevail, a 
defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994); see Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
The record clearly shows that Wallace's trial counsel, Brenda Whiteley, knew 
that Wallace was concerned about the prosecutor's alleged bias against Wallace and the 
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selective prosecution based on his race (R. 135 at 3-4). However, Whiteley was 
unwilling to file the motion before trial and specifically told the trial court that Wallace 
had to proceed with the motion uon his own" because she did not want to be 
"connected" with the motion (R. 135 at 4). Despite the fact that Wallace retained 
Whiteley and paid her with his own money, she refused to respect his decisions on how 
to proceed with the motion (R. 25). Wallace's affidavit shows that his claim is 
meritorious in that he has at least carried his burden to establish selective prosecution. 
Therefore, an evidentiary hearing likely would have been held had Whiteley timely filed 
and pursued the motion. 
By refusing to proceed with Wallace's wishes, Whiteley failed to follow Rule 
1.2(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. This rule provides that "a lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation" subject to 
any legal restraints. Moreover, Whiteley's representation fell below an objective 
standard because Wallace's meritorious assertions required an evidentiary hearing upon 
filing of the motion. Had the motion been timely filed, an evidentiary hearing would 
have been granted, Wallace would have been entitled to discoverable documents to 
support his claim, and it is likely the trial court would have found in his favor. It is also 
likely that had the evidentiary hearing been granted, the prosecution would have offered 
Wallace a plea. Thus, had Whiteley timely filed the motion, it is likely that Wallace 
would have received a more favorable outcome. Accordingly, Wallace was denied his 
right to effective assistance of counsel and his conviction should be reversed and an 
evidentiary hearing granted to resolve this issue. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Wallace asks that this Court reverse his conviction for 
assault by a prisoner and reverse this matter to the Fifth District Court for an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of selective prosecution. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of November, 2004. 
MargaretT. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 1st day of November, 
2004. 
l^ln^yi^rVTTI. / ^ ^ ^ V Y l , 
*\^\,r 
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ADDENDA 
11 
Orrin Bruce Wallace # 75977 >•- , 
Puratory Correctional Facility ' 
750 S. 5400 W. 
HURRICANE, UTAH 84737 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINTGON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE 
Defendant. Criminal No. 031500641 
AFFIDAVIT FOR ENTRY OF 
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION 
STATE OFUTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON SS: AFFIDAVIT OF 
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE 
Comes Now the defendant in the abovestyle case pro se ORRIN 
BRUCE WALLACE, AND AFTER BEING DULY SWORN, deposes and 
says: 
1) That he is representing himself in this matter by and through counsel. 
2) That the Plaintiff the State of Utah is Selectively Prosecuting this case. 
3) Other inmates similarly situated have had the opportunity to plead to a lesser degree in 
the cateory of assault. 
4) That I Orrin Bruce Wallace have not been afforded that same opportunity as the 
majority of my peers who happen to be of other races besides AFRICAN AMERICAN. 
5) That this "Discrimintory Treatment" deprives me of Equal Protect of the Law 
Guananteed of the United Staes Constitution. 
6) Therefore the Selective Prosecution of the case at bar is improperly motivated due to 
the fact that it is based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race. 
7) The defendant Orrin Bruce Wallace is entitled by law to have a Fair Prosecution 
without theTaint of Suspicion. Clear and Free of Racial Discrimination. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for an order as follows: 
1) Declaring the defendant be afforded - to the reduction of a lesser degree of penalty, 
i.e. a misdemeanor. 
2) Declaring that this prosecution is Selective, Vindictive- and Fundamentally unfair. 
3) Grant unto Defendant such other and further relief as this court may deem just and 
proper. 
AFFIDAVIT FURTHER SAYTH NAUGHT 
Done this date: „ ^ J 
<pr^BruceJwallace 
BY (J^H^ 
Sworn to Under Penalty of Perjury 
COPIES FURNISHED TO: CLERK OF COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN 
BRENDA S. WHITELY 
Orrin Bruce Wallace # 75977 rrrrn r\r>r \ i P^.\9:r<0 
Puratory Correctional Facility ' ^ u - ; •< 
750 S. 5400 W. ,
 K 
HURRICANE, UTAH 84737 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINTGON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE 
Defendant. Criminal No. 031500641 
Memorandum of Law 
The States selective prosecution and or vindictiveness is not per se an isolated incident, 
and the evidence will show that Mr.Paul Christensen has committed various violations in 
an attempt to put Mr. Orrin Bruce Wallace away by any means possible even if he has to 
violate Constitutional Rights to do so. 
1) It has been the standard of practice for the State to settle Assault by Prisoner cases, the 
American Judicial system encourages settlement any and all law students are taught right 
off the bat that even from English Common Law settlement has always been inspired. So 
why not settle in this case? 
2) There have been far more severe cases in where the state has settled. 
3) Just recently a case was settled of a defendant [Chad White] a state inmate who had 
cave another inmates sinus in, this inmate [Chad White] was given a Class B misdemenor 
also credited for the time served in Punitive Isolation. This case was setted without going 
to trial. 
4) [Chad White] who is also {white} was also charged with 76-5-102.5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. Fred Mitchell who is also {Indian} another state inmate 
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that was charged with Assault By a Prisoner also got the chance to plead to a lesser 
degree. 
5) This case evolves around Racial insult, and for that matter it would be deemed that the 
Prosecutor in this case refuses to negotiate a settlement. 
6) In the instant case a open hand slap was used in which the other inmate also retaliated 
with a open hand slap. 
7) Defendant would have settled in the above case given the opportunity, but the 
Prosecutor in the case refused to do so. 
8) There is history along with animosity between the defenant Orrin Bruce Wallace and 
the prosecutor Mr. Paul R.Christensen dating back to August 2001. 
9) This history stimulates from the the defendant exercising his constitutional rights to 
defend himself at times pro se and other times co- counsel; over the last two years. 
"There is no vindictiveness as long as the prosecutor's decision is based upon the normal 
factors ordinarily considered in determining what course to pursue, rather than upon 
genuine animus against the defendant for an improper reason or in retaliation for exercise 
of legal or constitutional rights." . . . Our inquiry must be whether, "as a practical matter, 
there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have 
occurred but for hostility or punitive animus towards the defendant because he exercised 
his specific legal right." 
Raymer, 941 F.2d at 1042 (quoting United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th 
Cir. 1982)). We explained how the test was to be applied: 
A defendant has the burden of proof and must establish either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. 
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the prosecution to justify its decision with legitimate, articulable, 
objective reasons. 
See; 965 F.2d 848::United States v. P.H.E., Inc.::May 26, 1992 
This approach has been employed by other courts as well. See, e.g., United States v. 
Adams, 870 F.2d 1140,1146 (6th Cir. 1989) (where criminal defendant presents evidence 
of vindictive prosecution, defendant is entitled to evidentiary hearing and discovery to 
permit her to develop defense). The pragmatic and common-sense nature of the analysis 
also has been recognized. See Council for Periodical Distr. Ass'n v. Evans, 642 F. Supp. 
552, 556 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (criminal prosecution enjoined if plaintiff shows conduct was 
constitutionally protected and improper purpose was "a major motivating factor and 
played a prominent role in the decision to prosecute"), affd in relevant part, 827 F.2d 
1483 (11th Cir. 1987). 
We conclude that appellants have already satisfied their burden of showing that the 
indictment is the tainted fruit of a prosecutorial attempt to curtail PHE's future First 
Amendment protected speech. Analogizing from the teachings Raymer, we are satisfied 
that they have met their burden of showing "either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness which will give rise to a presumption of 
vindictiveness." 941 F.2d at 1040. On remand the burden now shifts to the government 
"to justify its decision with legitimate, articulable, objective reasons." Id. In considering 
whether such proper reasons exist, the polestar to guide the district court on remand will 
be the controlling precept it recognized in its previous opinion in this case: 
The inquiry is whether, "'as a practical matter, there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood 
of prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for the hostility or punitive 
animus towards the defendant because he exercised his specific legal rights.'" 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 (quoting Raymer, 941 F.2d at 1042 (quoting United States v. Gallegos-
Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 1982))) (emphasis supplied). 
10) In this case specifically the defendant uses his legal right to represent himself when in 
some instances counsel neglects to do so. The mediocrity of some counsel that has 
represented the defendant in the pass two years has simply been distasteful were the 
defendant sometimes feels (that in order to get something right he must relie upon 
himself) this comes from the defendant being self reliance in rememberance from his 
favorite Author " Ralph Waldo Emmerson". 
11) Defendant alleges that his respective rights to equal protection under the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution and his rights to the uniform operation of 
laws under article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution are in violation. As a result, he 
argues, that he being deprived of due process of law under the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 821 P.2d 457::Herman v. State:.'November 26, 1991. 
12) Defendant contends, however, that others within the class of persons who have been 
charged of these crimes have been afforded the opportunity of reduction of the offense to 
a lower cateory. And some offenders have not been charged at all. 
13) Defendant also asserts that there is an intentional and deliberate plan on the part of 
state officilas to enforce the law selectively against him. Due the fact that the DA in this 
case has a personal vindecta aganist him. What might that plan be? (1) The states plan is 
to convict the defendant of a felony at all cost. (2) Prior to the filing of these charges the 
State officials had two other cases pending in which the chances of obtaining a felony 
conviction were very slim at best; one case is filled with perjured testimoney; and the 
other case state oficials know or should know that the defendant is innocent as charged. 
(3) With the filing of the third case in which the state officials know they had the 
defendant [dead bang] they proceeded to use the latter case to coerce defendant in to 
pleading guilty to a package deal.(4) When prosecuting attorney found out that the 
defendant would not go for this package deal they refuse to negoiate settlement at all. 
14) Defendant also asserts that he is being "selectively prosecuted" because of his being 
an African American. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21896::UNITED STATES v. 
BRYANT::April 29,1992, Decided 
15) "There is a presumption that prosecution for violation of the criminal law is in good 
faith." United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1980). "To demonstrate 
unconstitutionally selective prosecution a defendant must show (1) he was singled out for 
prosecution while others similarly situated were not generally prosecuted; and (2) the 
prosecution was invidiously based on racial, religious, or other impermissible 
considerations." United States v. Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159,161 (10th Cir. 1986). 
Furthermore, where there has been no factual showing that the statute has not been 
enforced evenhandedly, the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. 
United States v. Guerrero, 667 F.2d 862, 869 (10th Cir. 1981). 
Safeguarding the rights of the accused has been viewed, at least by some justices as a 
critical aspect of protecting the rights of minorities. Justice Frankfurter, for example, 
decribed accused persons as themselves constituting a highly unpopular minority (noting 
that "those accused of crime *** have few friends" )and argued that the judiciary 
therefore had a special obligation to provide " alert and strenuous resistanced " to 
infringements of criminal procedural safeguards. Harris V. U.S.,331 U.S. 145, 67 S.CT. 
1098, 91 L.ED. 1399(1947), 28, 87, 104, 105. Commentators have suggested that the fact 
that accused persons so frequently are members of disavantaged groups also has 
contributed to the courts heightened concern that the criminal justice process be fairly 
administered. It is certainly true that the court has taken signifiant steps to elimnate the 
traditional disavantages that precluded the the indigent defendant from fully exercising 
his procedural ritghs (see 7.1) So too the court has noted on several occasions that, to 
preserve the integrity of the criminal justice process, Constitutional safegauds must 
preclude any suggestion of racial discrimination in its administration. See Rose v. 
Mitchell (8.3(b); Batson V.Ky.8.6(b).(guoted from Criminal Procedure Constitutional 
Limitations in a Nut Shell) pg 27-28 1.3(a) Criminal process as a civil liberty. 
[Jerold H.Israel, and Wayne R. Lafave.] 
Is it permissible to single out a individual because of the color of his skin ? 
Or because a defendant exercises his legal right to defend himself in a County or State for 
that matter in which he is a minorty ? 
Is it ethical for the state to go through any length to secure a conviction even if they have 
to breake the great laws of this Nation? 
11
 Prosecutor does not represent an entity whose interest include winning at all cost: 
prosecutor's client is society< which seeks justice not Victory U.S. V. Doe, 860 F2d 488 
(lstCir.1988) 
Is it okay for white counter parts to breake each others jaws, breake each others noeses 
,cave in each others sinuses and recieve a lesser degree penalty in the process; than that 
- *? ^ 
of a Black individual whos crime is not nearly as severe? 
But if a Black man so much as raise his hand toward a white man even after being 
provoked; it is manatory that he recieve a 3rd degree Felony with no chance to plea to a 
lesser degree unless defendant pleas guilty to another felony in a seperate case! 
Louis D. Brandeis- U.S. Supreme Court- 1856-1941: once stated 
,f
 To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the ends justifies the means - to 
declare that the Goverment may commit crimes in order to secure conviction of a private 
criminal - would bring terrible retrbution." 
The Equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is in place to safeguard me 
from these illegalites. 
Robert M. LaFollette, Sr, -American Polititical & Reform Leader- 1925: 
" let no man think that we can deny civil liberty to others and retain it for 
ourselves When zealous agents of the Goverment arrest suspected 'radicals' without 
warrant, hold them without prompt trial, deny them access to counsel and admission of 
ba i l . . . we have shorn the Bill of Rights of its sanctity as a shield to every American 
citizen." 
Done this date 
Sworn to Under Penalty of Perjury 
BY 
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINTGON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ORRIN BRUCE WALLACE 
Defendant. Criminal No. 031500641 
Motion For Evidentary Hearing 
COMES NOW, Defendant Orrin B. Wallace, pro se and respectfully request this court to grant a 
Evidentary Hearing on the issue of SELECTIVE PROSECUTION in the abovestyled case that was 
tried on September 30, 2003. The grounds for this motion are: 
1) Defendant alleges that his respective rights to equal protection under the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution and his rights to the uniform operation of laws under article I, 
section 24 of the Utah Constitution are in violation. As a result, he argues, that he being deprived of due 
process of law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 821 P.2d 457::Herman v. State: .-November 26, 1991. 
2) Defendant contends, however, that others within the class of persons who have been charged of 
these crimes have been afforded the opportunity of reduction of the offense to a lower cateory. And some 
offenders have not been charged at all. 
3) Defendant also asserts that there is an intentional and deliberate plan on the part of state 
officilas to enforce the law selectively against him. Due the fact that the DA in this case has a personal 
vindecta aganist him. 
4) Defendant also asserts that he is being "selectively prosecuted" because of his being an African 
American. In violation of the "EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION "the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Also see AFFIDAVIT FOR SELECTIVE PROSECUTION. 
NOTARY 
Dated this day_ IdsoCf*?^ 
750 South 5400 West 
Hurricane, UT 84737 
COPIES FURNISHED TO: Clerk of the Court, Washington County 
Paul R. Chirstensen States Attorny 
Brenda S. Whitely Esq. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CHASE T. ENCE 
750 SOUTH 5400 WEST 
HURRICANE, UT 84737 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
AUGUST 22,2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
